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Abstract 
Self-disgust is a distinct self-conscious emotion schema that is characterized by disgust 
appraisals directed towards the self. Recent studies have demonstrated the negative effects of 
self-disgust on physical and mental health, but little is known about the psychological 
characteristics that are associated with self-disgust experiences. The present study assessed 
the direct and indirect effects of impulsivity, self-regulation, and emotion regulation on self-
disgust. Overall, 294 participants (M age = 21.84 years, SD = 4.56) completed structured and 
anonymous measures of trait impulsivity, self-regulation, emotion regulation strategies, and 
self-disgust. Path analysis showed that non-planning impulsivity and expressive suppression 
(positively) and cognitive reappraisal and self-regulation (negatively) predicted self-disgust. 
Intervening variable analysis showed that attentional and non-planning impulsivity had 
significant indirect effects on self-disgust via emotional regulation strategies and self-
regulation. Our findings provide, for the first time, evidence about the association between 
self-disgust and individual differences in impulsivity, self-regulation, and emotion regulation, 
and have implications for the psychological phenomena that may lead to self-disgust 
experiences in non-clinical populations.  
Keywords: Self-disgust; self-conscious emotions; self-regulation; emotion regulation; 
impulsivity.  
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The roles of impulsivity, self-regulation, and emotion regulation in the experience of 
self-disgust 
 Disgust is a universal emotion that serves survival in humans by alerting the body to 
potential contamination and exposure to biological pathogens (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 
2008). In this respect, disgust has been primarily associated with food and body products 
(Rozin & Fallon, 1987), and other stimuli that serve as primes for disease and pathogen 
exposure (Curtis & Biran, 2001; Curtis, Aunger, & Rabie, 2004). The disease and pathogen 
avoidance model of disgust posits that the core mechanism of disgust has been developed to 
bias behaviour against primes of disease, and through social development, this mechanism 
triggers disgust towards moral and social norm violations (Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009). 
Similarly, Curtis and Biran (2001) argued that the emotion of disgust has biologically 
developed as an aversion to physical parasites, and socio-culturally developed as aversion to 
social parasites. Supporting evidence has also shown that disgust sensitivity is differentiated 
across domains pertaining to pathogen exposure, sexuality and moral violations (Tybur, 
Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009). Simpson, Carter, Anthony, and Overton (2006) 
demonstrated that disease-related and socio-moral disgust stimuli had some unique distinctive 
properties (e.g., temporal duration). In support of this view, recent evidence from cognitive 
neuroscience showed that a single neural region (the insula) may serve the three domains of 
disgust sensitivity (Vicario, Rafal, Martino, & Avenanti, 2017), and that core and moral 
disgust stimuli provoke similar facial motor activity (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 
2009).    
 While disgust is meant to serve an adaptive function to the biological and the socio-
moral self, abnormal levels of disgust reactivity to a range of elicitors (e.g., measured by 
higher scores in proneness to disgust in self-reported surveys) has been associated with 
mental health problems, such as anxiety, mood, and eating disorders (e.g., Fox, 2009; Ille, 
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Schöggl, Kapfhammer, Arendasy, Sommer, & Schienle, 2014; Olatunji, Cisler, McKay, & 
Phillips, 2010), and may represent a risk factor for suicidal ideation (e.g., among people with 
eating disorders; Chu, Bodell, Ribeiro, & Joiner, 2015). Power and Dalgeish (2008) argued 
that a special form of disgust directed to the self (i.e., self-focused disgust or, simply, self-
disgust) is more relevant to certain psychopathologies, and that self-disgust can explain the 
association between dysfunctional thought patterns, such as rumination and negative 
evaluations of the self and the world, and resulting depressive mood.  Indeed, in his original, 
influential writings on depression, Beck (1967) argued that self-critical and maladaptive self-
focused cognitions elicited negative self-directed feelings, which eventually resulted in 
depressive states.  The role of affect was critical in this process, and was conceptualised by 
Beck as explicitly involving disgust: “the feeling of self-dislike is stronger and may progress 
to a feeling of disgust with himself” (Beck, 1967, p. 18).  
In support of this argument, Overton, Markland, Taggart, Bagshaw, and Simpson 
(2008) developed a self-report measure of self-disgust (the Self-Disgust Scale [SDS]) and 
showed that self-disgust mediated the association between dysfunctional thoughts and 
depressive symptoms, a finding that was supported by subsequent studies (albeit with more 
complex structures; e.g., Powell, Simpson, & Overton, 2013; Simpson, Hillman, Crawford, & 
Overton, 2010). In their conceptualization and measurement of self-disgust, Overton et al. 
(2008) identified two dimensions of self-disgust: the "disgusting self", which reflects disgust 
towards the self (e.g., "I find myself repulsive"), and "disgusting ways", which represents 
disgust towards one's own actions and behaviour (e.g., "the way I behave makes me despise 
myself"). The two-dimensional structure of self-disgust and the conceptual distinction 
between self/personal and behavioural disgust were validated in another study that used an 
alternative measure of self-disgust (i.e., the Questionnaire for the Assessment of Self-Disgust 
[QASD]; Schienle et al., 2015).  Although there are alternative explanations about the 
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development and adaptation of the basic disgust emotion towards physical and "social" 
parasites (Curtis & Biran, 2001), much less is known about the psychological antecedents of 
self-disgust - in other words, how and why people become to feel disgusted with aspects of 
their self. Partly, this may be attributed to the relatively more recent development of self-
disgust research, and to the focus of this research on the effects of self-disgust on mental 
health and well-being (e.g., Azlan, Overton, Simpson, & Powell, 2017; Brake, Rojas, Badour, 
Dutton, & Feldner, 2017; Overton et al., 2008). Exploring the psychological origins of self-
disgust, however, presents a compelling and equally important domain of research inquiry 
(Powell et al., 2015). In this paper, we particularly focus on the role of self-regulatory failure 
and impulsivity as potential explanatory variables of the self-disgust experience. 
Self-Disgust as an Emotion Schema  
 Qualitative research into the subjective experience of self-disgust showed that social 
comparison processes and the internalization of other people's reactions and criticisms were 
frequently mentioned as contributing factors to the genesis of self-disgust (Powell, Overton, 
& Simpson, 2014). These findings suggest that self-disgust requires some sort of self-
awareness and a symbolic representation of the self, a feature that is not necessary for the 
experience of basic emotions (e.g., fear, anger, surprise, disgust), but plays an important role 
in the experience of more complex, self-conscious emotions, such as pride, shame, guilt and 
embarrassment (Power & Dalgeish, 2008; Tracy & Robins, 2004). In particular, a main 
distinctive feature of self-conscious emotions is that they entail self-evaluation, self-
reflection, and self-representation. People are aware of and reflect on their actions and 
evaluate them against socio-cultural and moral norms and standards, and accordingly 
experience a variety of self-conscious emotions (Leary, 2004; Tracy & Robins, 2007). 
Evidence has also shown that compared to other animals, social species that are capable of 
experiencing self-awareness (e.g., primates) are also capable of displaying emotional 
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reactions that are similar to self-conscious emotions, such as pride, shame, and 
embarrassment (Tracy & Robins, 2004; Weisfeld & Dillon, 2012). Because self-conscious 
emotions require self-referential appraisals as well as an appreciation of other people's 
emotions and thoughts, they are said to emerge later in development as compared to basic 
emotions that are experienced from childbirth (Izard, 2007; Muris & Meesters, 2014).  
 Cognitive complexity is another distinctive feature of self-conscious emotions.  While 
basic emotions can involve more complex cognitive processes, they do not necessitate them 
in the same way as self-conscious emotions do (e.g., de Hooge et al., 2011; Tracy & Robins, 
2007).  Self-conscious emotions (e.g., shame, guilt, pride) typically involve more complex 
cognitive perquisites and processing than basic emotions (e.g., anger, fear), including a need 
for self-awareness; an awareness of others’ appraisals; an understanding of social standards, 
norms and rules; the causal attribution of actions and goals to social actors, including things 
like intent; and an understanding of the surrounding situational and contextual factors during 
the emotion eliciting experience (de Hooge et al., 2011).  The same degree of cognitive 
complexity is present in the conceptualization of self-disgust as a psychological phenomenon 
that entails "an enduring (or repetitive) disgust reaction elicited by particular aspect(s) of the 
self, which are deemed significant to an individual's sense of self, and appraised as relatively 
constant and/or not easily changeable" (Powell, Simpson, & Overton, 2015, p .5). Given the 
shared features between self-disgust and other self-conscious emotions, some researchers 
have argued that self-disgust represents a distinct self-conscious emotion (Roberts & 
Goldenberg, 2007), or that it represents a special form of shame (Power & Dalgeish, 2008). 
Powell et al. (2015) provided an encompassing definition of self-disgust as an emotion 
schema (see also Izard, 2007), or an enduring cognitive-affective orientation towards the self, 
involving an affective component similar to the emotional experience of disgust, with 
relevant cognitive and higher-order appraisals (e.g., “my body is revolting”).  In their 
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definition, Powell et al. (2015) emphasized the self-referential dimensions of self-disgust, as 
well as the dynamic interaction between the emotional experiences of (self-directed) disgust, 
associated self-referential cognitive content, such as thoughts and beliefs about one's actions 
and physical body, and related behaviours (e.g., avoidance and rejection).  
 While self-disgust is thought to be often concomitant with other negative self-directed 
affective phenomena, such as shame (Powell et al., 2014), Powell et al. (2015) argue for 
unique, identifying properties, such as the phenomenological state of revulsion, a discrete 
expressive profile (e.g., facial expression), links with contamination and the laws of 
contagion and similarity, and specific appraisals (e.g., “yuck, that is repulsive”).  Shame, on 
the other hand, is largely concerned with hierarchical submission and evaluations of reduced 
social rank (Gilbert, 2007).  A small body of research has also confirmed independent 
predictive validity for self-disgust over and above other self-conscious emotions such as 
shame (e.g., Olatunji, Cox, & Kim, 2015; Penley & Tomaka, 2002).  While there is scope for 
more research to empirically support the differentiation between self-disgust and other self-
conscious emotions it is equally important to identify the experiences and psychological 
processes that may lead people to experience self-disgust (Powell et al., 2015). In this paper, 
we strongly emphasize the cognitive self-referential aspect of self-disgust and we argue that 
self-disgust partly stems from people's capacity (or the lack thereof) to resist impulses and 
exercise regulation of their thoughts, actions, and emotions.   
Self-Disgust as Self-Regulatory Failure 
 Self-regulation is defined as people's capacity to focus on their long-term goals and 
resist temptation and impulses for immediate gratification (Carver & Scheier, 2016). As such, 
self-regulation involves the ability to alter thoughts, actions, and emotions in a way that 
serves goal striving, whether the goal is set by the self, the society or both. Self-regulation 
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has gained considerable research and media attention over the last 15 years, and some 
researchers have even proclaimed it as humanity's greatest strength, and as the key to success 
in life (Baumeister, Leith, Muraven, & Bratslavsky, 2002). Indeed, a large body of evidence 
has shown that higher self-regulation is associated with better academic and work 
performance, good interpersonal relationships, better mental health outcomes, emotional 
well-being, and life satisfaction (Hoffmann, Luhmann, Fisher, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2014; 
Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Accordingly, self-regulation failure has been 
associated with a whole host of adverse psychological and behavioural outcomes, such as 
substance use, impulsive purchase behaviour and overspending, school underachievement, 
relationship problems, violence, sexual risk-taking, and long-term unemployment 
(Baumeister, 2003; Carey, Neal, & Collins, 2004; Daly, Delaney, Egan, & Baumeister, 2015; 
DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007; Raffaelli & Crocket, 2003; Tangney et al., 
2004; Vohs & Faber, 2007). 
 Succumbing to impulses is perhaps one of the most obvious expressions of self-
regulatory failure (DeYoung and Rueter, 2016), and behavioural impulsivity has been 
recognized as one of the key components of inadequate self-regulation (Baumeister & 
Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister & Vohs, 2007). According to Carver and colleagues (2009), 
trait impulsivity involves the presence of an urge or desire, and the inability to self-regulate, 
inhibit, and control that impulse. Trait impulsivity has been associated with psychopathology 
(e.g., Grano et al., 2007; Peluso et al., 2007; Whitesire and Lynam, 2001), and studies on 
children with ADHD have indicated a positive association between childhood impulsivity 
and later development of depression (Brodsky et al., 2001). Trait impulsivity has also been 
positively associated with a range of adverse behavioural outcomes, such as unhealthy eating 
and overeating (e.g., Jasinska et al., 2012), sexual risk-taking (e.g., Kahn, Kaplowitz, 
Goodman, & Emans, 2002), as well as substance-related and behavioural addictions (e.g., 
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Lee et al., 2012; Verdejo-Garcia, Lawrence, & Clark, 2008). According to Barratt's three-
factor model impulsivity reflects three main characteristics: greater motor activation (motor 
impulsivity), such as acting at the spur of the moment; less attention to the task at hand 
(attention impulsivity); and a reduced ability to plan actions (non-planning impulsivity; 
Patton et al. 1995; Stanford et al. 2009). Empirical support for this model has come from 
studies using self-reported measures, such as Barratt's Impulsiveness Scale (BIS; Patton et al. 
1995), as well as studies showing a positive correlation between the BIS and objective 
neuropsychological and laboratory behavioural measures of impulsivity, event-related 
potentials (e.g., reduced P300 amplitude) and fMRI studies (Asahi et al., 2004; Ding et al. 
2014; Moeller et al. 2001; Russo et al. 2008; Spinella, 2007). 
 Importantly, self-regulation and impulsivity have been differentially associated with 
the experience of self-conscious emotions. In particular, Tangney et al. (2004) reported a 
significant positive correlation between higher self-regulation scores and guilt, and a 
significant negative association between higher self-regulation and shame, even after 
controlling for the effects of social desirability. Another study showed that self-regulation 
failure in an exercise context (i.e., missing an exercise session) was associated with the 
experience of shame and guilt (Streuber, Meade, & Strachan, 2015). In a similar vein, Sheikh 
and Janoff-Bulman (2010) found that inadequate self-regulation (e.g., failing to restrain 
excessive eating, gambling, and overspending) were significantly associated with shame. 
Carver, Sinclair and Johnson (2010) reported that authentic pride (e.g., feelings of 
accomplishment and confidence) was positively associated with self-control, whereas 
hubristic pride (e.g., feelings of arrogance) was associated with impulsivity. Finally, an 
experimental study on consumer behaviour showed that participants with higher trait 
impulsivity succumbed to more impulsive purchase behaviours than consumers with lower 
impulsivity scores, and this self-indulgence was associated with experiencing negative 
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purchase-related self-conscious emotions, such as guilt and regret (Ramanathan & Williams, 
2007; Experiment 1).   
   Taken together, these findings highlight the role of self-regulatory capacity (or the 
lack thereof) in the experience of self-conscious emotions in a simple but profound way. 
When people succumb to impulsive behaviour and fail to regulate their actions according to 
ideal self-representations or standards, they are likely to experience shame, guilt, and 
hubristic pride, whereas adequate self-regulation is associated with authentic pride (Carver et 
al., 2010). Possibly, these associations can be attributed to the self-representational and 
cognitive complexity of self-conscious emotions: people reflect on how well they can 
regulate their behaviour, evaluate their behaviour against personal or societal expectations 
and standards, and accordingly experience self-conscious emotions. Self-disgust is also 
characterized by self-representation and cognitive complexity (e.g., Powell et al., 2015), and 
this makes it theoretically plausible to anticipate an association between self-regulation, trait 
impulsivity, and self-disgust. People may experience more self-disgust from succumbing to 
impulsive behaviour and failing to self-regulate, and less self-disgust when adequate self-
regulation is exercised and impulsive behaviour is restrained. Nevertheless, no study has 
addressed this question thus far.  
Emotion Regulation and Self-Disgust 
 Emotion regulation represents a group of automatic or controlled processes by which 
people try to modify their emotions in order to achieve a desired goal (Aldao, Nolen-
Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; Gross, 2013; Webb, Miles, Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2012), and 
this goal may entail increasing (up-regulation) or decreasing (down-regulation) the magnitude 
or the duration of emotional responses (Gross, 2013). According to the process model of 
emotion regulation (Gross & Thompson, 2007) people can regulate their emotions before 
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(antecedent-focused emotion regulation) or after (response-focused emotion regulation) the 
emotional response, and different emotion regulation strategies have different consequences 
(Gross, 2013). Cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression represent two distinct and 
widely studied emotion regulation strategies. The former is an antecedent-focused strategy 
and involves the cognitive re-interpretation of events or situations in order to alter the 
emotional response or reduce its impact before it occurs, whereas the latter represents a 
response-focused strategy that aims to modulate emotional responses after they have occurred 
by inhibiting expressive behaviour (e.g., modulating anger by suppressing it; Gross, 2013; 
2015). 
 Both cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression are commonly used to down-
regulate emotions but they have differential consequences on various levels of human 
functioning. At a cognitive level, expressive suppression is associated with poorer memory 
for the situation that elicited the emotional response, whereas cognitive reappraisal has been 
associated with improved memory and exam performance (Sheppes & Gross, 2011). 
Similarly, cognitive reappraisal, but not expressive suppression, attenuated the effect of 
negative emotions (e.g., disgust, fear) on decision-making (Heilman, Crisan, Houser, Miclea, 
& Miu, 2010). At a social level, suppression has been associated with less liking from 
interacting partners, whereas cognitive reappraisal does not seem to have an adverse impact 
on interpersonal relationships (Butler, Egloff, Wilhelm, Smith, & Erickson, 2003; Gross & 
John, 2003). At an affective level, cognitive reappraisal is associated with decreased negative 
emotional experiences and the increase of positive ones, but expressive suppression decreases 
positive emotional experiences and leaves negative ones unchanged (Gross & John, 2003; 
Gross & Thompson, 2007). Similarly, a cross-cultural study showed that cognitive 
reappraisal was associated positively with life satisfaction and trait positive affect, and 
negatively with depressed mood and trait negative affect, and the opposite pattern of 
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associations was observed for expressive suppression (Haga, Kraft, & Corby, 2009). Finally, 
expressive suppression has been positively associated with higher scores in mental health 
symptoms, such as anxiety, PTSD, and depression (Moore, Zoellner, & Mollenholt, 2008). 
 Despite the abundance of studies on the effects of cognitive reappraisal and 
expressive suppression on various aspects of human functioning, there is limited evidence 
about the effects of those emotion regulation strategies on the experience of self-conscious 
emotions, such as self-disgust. This is an important omission for the following reasons. First, 
the conceptualization of self-disgust as a self-conscious emotion schema involves a lasting 
appraisal of the self (or its actions) as disgusting and repulsive, and this appraisal may be 
activated by specific beliefs, situations or events (Powell et al., 2015). As an antecedent-
focused strategy, cognitive reappraisal may counteract the effects of relevant eliciting events, 
thoughts, or situations before self-disgust is experienced, and accordingly lead to lower levels 
of self-disgust. Support for this argument comes from studies that have demonstrated how 
appraisals (e.g., causal attributions) can influence the experience of self-conscious emotions, 
such as shame and guilt (Tracy & Robins, 2006). Furthermore, as a response-modulation 
strategy, expressive suppression will require a great deal of resources to modulate self-disgust 
once it is experienced (Sheppes & Gross, 2011), and studies have shown that suppression is 
an ineffective strategy in undoing the effects of negative emotional states (Gross & John, 
2003; Gross & Thompson, 2007). Therefore, if cognitive reappraisal and expressive 
suppression have differential effects on the emotional experience (Gross, 2015; Gross & 
Thompson, 2007), then it is theoretically plausible that they would be differentially 
associated with self-disgust, with cognitive appraisal negatively associated and expressive 
suppression positively associated with self-directed disgust responses. However, this 
assumption has not been empirically examined as yet.     
The Present Study 
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  Over the last decade a growing body of research has examined the association 
between self-disgust and physical and mental health outcomes in various domains (e.g., 
Azlan et al., 2017; Brake et al., 2017; Ille et al., 2014; Overton et al., 2008). Nevertheless, the 
psychological characteristics and processes that may give rise to self-disgust experiences 
have not been empirically investigated as yet. The focus of this paper is on the psychological 
characteristics that may lead people to experience self-disgust, and more specifically, on the 
roles of self-regulation, emotion regulation and impulsivity in this process. The existing 
evidence supports the contention that self-disgust represents a self-conscious emotion schema 
that incorporates some of the key features of other self-conscious emotions (i.e., cognitive 
complexity and symbolic self-representation); emerges from the complex interaction between 
perception, emotion, appraisals, and cognition; and can be triggered or "elicited" by a 
reflection on psychological or physical characteristics of the self (Powell et al., 2015). With 
this conceptualization in mind, we propose a model of self-disgust that particularly addresses 
the roles of impaired self-regulation, maladaptive emotion regulation, and high impulsivity as 
key psychological characteristics that may elicit self-disgust experiences. It is important to 
note that, within the context of the present study, the elicitation of self-disgust is not 
discussed as a stimulus-response process, such as the automatic activation of revulsion and 
disgust following exposure to disgust-related stimuli (e.g., faeces). Rather, following from 
Powell et al. (2015) we refer to the elicitation of self-disgust as the cognitive, affective and 
physiological response to lasting features of the self. This conceptualization is consistent with 
Izard's (2007; 2009) contention that emotion schemas, such as self-disgust, can be activated 
by certain environmental triggers (i.e., external stimuli), as well as "internal" stimuli, such as 
thoughts, memories and self-appraisals.   
 Our model is based on two contentions. First, the symbolic self-representation and 
cognitive complexity aspects of self-disgust allow people to reflect on their actions, judge 
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their actions against their self-ideals (or ideals posed by the society or referent others), and 
accordingly experience self-disgust. According to Powell et al. (2015), self-disgust involves a 
lasting appraisal of the self as disgusting, and the proxy factors that can elicit self-disgust 
experiences may involve individual characteristics and traits or other important aspects of the 
self  (e.g., "the way I act makes me feel sick"). Relatedly, self-appraisals of one's own 
behaviour and actions is an important aspect of self-disgust, and this is reflected in the way 
self-disgust has been operationalized and measured in relevant quantitative studies (e.g., "the 
way I behave makes me despise myself", "I feel good about the ways I behave", and "my 
behaviour repels other people"; Overton et al., 2008). Poor self-regulation and higher 
impulsivity appear to be the cornerstones of a wide range of problem behaviours (Baumeister 
et l., 2002; Tangney et al., 2004), and should provide the factual basis for negative self-
evaluations of one's own actions. Therefore, it is theoretically plausible that people should 
experience lower levels of self-disgust if they lived up to their ideal self-standards by 
exhibiting adequate self-regulation and restraining impulsive behaviour, and higher levels of 
self-disgust if they failed to self-regulate and succumbed to impulsiveness.   
 Secondly, emotion regulation strategies can differentially influence the experience of 
self-disgust. People who adopt adaptive emotion-regulation strategies, such as cognitive 
reappraisal, are allowed to re-construe and reinterpret the outcomes of their actions and, 
accordingly, the experience of self-disgust will be attenuated. In contrast, the use of 
maladaptive emotion regulation strategies, such as expressive suppression, is focused on 
inhibiting the emotional response that ensued from impaired self-regulation and is 
insufficient to modulate the negative experience of self-disgust. Finally, the ability to regulate 
one's emotions has been associated with reaching behavioural goals, whereas the lack of such 
ability is often associated with self-regulatory failure and the expression of impulsive 
behaviours (Roberton Daffern, & Bucks, 2012). Also, models of self-regulation posit that 
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higher (vs. lower) self-regulation act protectively against impulsive urges on behavioural 
outcomes (e.g., Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister & Vohs, 2007), and research has 
shown that the adverse effects of impulsivity on behavioural and mental health outcomes can 
be mediated by emotion regulation strategies and self-regulation (e.g., d’Acremont & Van der 
Linden, 2007; Liau et al., 2015). It is sensible to argue that emotion and self-regulation could 
also play an intervening role and explain the association between impulsivity and self-
disgust. Based on these contentions, the following hypotheses were formed: 
H1: Higher self-regulation and lower trait impulsivity will be associated with lower levels of 
self-disgust. 
H2: Adaptive emotion regulation strategies (i.e., cognitive reappraisal) will be associated 
with lower levels of self-disgust. 
H3: Maladaptive emotion regulation strategies (i.e., expressive suppression) will be 
associated with higher levels of self-disgust. 
H4: The ability to regulate thoughts, emotions, and behaviour (i.e., emotion regulation and 
self-regulation) will indirectly account for (intervene in) the association between impulsivity 
and self-disgust.  
Methods 
Participants 
Overall, 450 individuals were approached face to face by a trained research assistant. 
Four hundred and thirty one participants agreed to take part in the study and, of them, 294 
cases were completed and eligible for analysis in the present study (final response rate = 
65.3%). Only complete cases were used in analyses due to the ethical right to withdraw from 
the survey at any time.  Missing data analysis showed that non-completers did not differ 
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significantly from the 294 cases, and that the missing cases could be classified as MCAR 
(Little's test p > 0.05). Participants were aged between 17 and 51 years (M = 21.84, SD = 
4.56), 60.5% were females, and 89.5% had a British background, and included undergraduate 
and postgraduate students from three universities in South Yorkshire, England. The research 
was carried out in accordance with the Code of Human Research Ethics of the British 
Psychological Society, and participants were provided with consent forms to complete, and 
were duly informed about their participation rights (i.e., voluntary and anonymous 
participation; no penalties for withdrawing from the study at any stage without previous 
notice). 
Measures 
 Demographics.  
 Demographic characteristics were assessed with open-ended questions asking 
participants to indicate their age (i.e., how old are you?), gender, and nationality.   
 Impulsivity. 
 Impulsivity was assessed with the Abbreviated Impulsiveness Scale (ABIS; Coutlee, 
Politzer, Hoyle, & Huettel, 2014). The ABIS is an 11-item measure of trait impulsivity, that 
is, people's tendency to act spontaneously and "on impulse" without thinking or reasoning 
about their actions. It consists of three sub-scales that reflect attentional (e.g., "I don't pay 
attention"), motor (e.g., "I say things without thinking"), and non-planning (e.g., "I am future 
oriented" reverse scored item) impulsivity. Calculating a total “impulsivity” score is not 
recommended psychometrically (Coutlee et al., 2014). Responses are coded on a 4-point 
Likert scale (1 = rarely/never, 4 = almost always/always). Following reverse scoring of 8 
items, a mean score is computed for each subscale and higher scores indicate higher 
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impulsiveness. The reliability and validity of the ABIS has been reported by Coutlee et al. 
(2014). In the present study, the internal consistency reliability coefficients (Cronbach's α) for 
each ABIS subscale was acceptable (ABIS non-planning α = 0.74; ABIS motor α = 0.75; 
ABIS attention α = 0.67).  
 Emotion regulation. 
 Emotion regulation was measured with the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; 
Gross & John, 2013). The ERQ is a 10-item measure that assesses individual differences in 
emotion regulation strategies. It consists of two sub-scales that reflect expressive suppression 
(e.g., "I control my emotions by not expressing them") and cognitive reappraisal (e.g., "When 
I want to feel positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change what I'm thinking 
about"). Responses are given on 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree). A mean score is computed for each scale and higher scores indicate higher emotion 
regulation. The reliability and validity of the ERQ have been reported in previous studies 
(Gross & John, 2003). In the present study the internal consistency reliability for the ERQ 
sub-scales was high (cognitive reappraisal α = 0.81; expressive suppression α = 0.72). 
 Self-regulation. 
 Self-regulation was measured with the 31-item Short Self-Regulation Questionnaire 
(SSRQ; Carey et al., 2004). The SSRQ is the shorter version of the Self-Regulation 
Questionnaire (SRQ; Brown, Miller, & Lawendowski, 1999) and reflects different aspects of 
people's self-regulatory capacity, such as goal-setting and monitoring (e.g., "I set goals for 
myself and keep track of my progress"), self-control (e.g., "I am able to resist temptation"), 
and deliberate thinking/reasoning of actions (e.g., "I usually think before I act"). Responses 
are given on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). A sum score is 
generated and higher scores reflect greater self-regulatory capacity. The reliability and 
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validity of the SSRQ has been reported previously (e.g., Carey et al., 2004) and in the present 
study the internal consistency reliability coefficient was high (α = 0.92).  
 Self-disgust. 
 Self-disgust was assessed with the Self-Disgust Scale (SDS; Overton et al., 2008), an 
18-item measure reflecting disgust and repulsiveness directed to the self. Six items are filler 
items (e.g., "I enjoy the company of others") and 12 items reflect self-disgust towards the self 
(e.g., "I find myself repulsive"), and towards one's behaviour/actions (e.g., "I often do things I 
find revolting"). Responses are coded on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly agree, 7 = 
strongly disagree), and after reverse scoring 9 items a total sum score is computed. Higher 
scores indicate higher levels of self-disgust. Self-disgust is reflected in the total sum score, as 
well as in the sub-scales of "disgusting self" (or physical self-disgust) and "disgusting ways" 
(or behavioural self-disgust), and the reliability and validity of this measure has been reported 
elsewhere (Overton et al., 2008). In the present study, the internal consistency reliability was 
acceptable for the total self-disgust scale (α = 0.88), and the subscales of behavioural (α = 
0.76) and physical self-disgust (α = 0.79). 
Design/Procedure  
A cross-sectional, correlational, survey-based design was used to measure the 
associations between demographic characteristics (age, gender, and nationality), impulsivity, 
emotion regulation, self-regulation, and self-disgust. As part of a larger study, participants 
were approached and recruited in University premises and were asked to complete an online 
survey (hosted on Qualtrics, www.qualtrics.com). Only participants who completed all study 
measures were included in this study, all other data were discarded. No time restrictions were 
applied and survey completion required approximately 15 minutes. 
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Data Analysis 
 As some of the study variables were not normally-distributed (and regular linear 
regression methods resulted in non-normally-distributed residuals), Spearman’s rho 
correlations were used to explore initial associations in the data, followed by a bootstrapped 
path analysis of the hypothesised relationships between the constructs.  Path analysis has 
many advantages over standard regression techniques, including the ability to estimate direct 
and indirect effects (through multiple intervening variables), and multiple dependent 
variables, simultaneously, allowing the researcher to account for the interdependence in the 
outcome variables (by correlating their error terms). As recommended (e.g., Hayes, 2009; 
Hayes & Scharkow, 2013), we used bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapping (10,000 
resamples; Mallinckrodt, Abraham, Wei, & Russell, 2006) to obtain confidence intervals (and 
associated probability values) for all direct and indirect effects in the path model.  
Bootstrapping is a robust alternative to standard parametric estimates, when the assumptions 
around the latter may be violated (Fox, 2008).  All data were analysed in SPSS v. 22 (IBM 
Corp., Armonk, NT, USA), and AMOS v. 24 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NT, USA). 
Results 
 The descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among the study variables are 
presented in Table 1.  In this sample, women reported significantly higher levels of physical 
self-disgust than men, rrb = .25, p < .001.  Cognitive reappraisal was negatively associated 
with physical, rs = −.19, p < .01, and behavioural, rs = −.19, p < .01, self-disgust.  On the 
other hand, expressive suppression was positively associated with physical, rs = .15, p < .01, 
and behavioural, rs = .24, p < .001, self-disgust.  The attention subscale of the ABIS was 
positively associated with physical, rs = .14, p < .05, and behavioural, rs = .14, p < .05, self-
disgust.  The motor subscale had a marginally significant relationship with physical self-
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disgust, rs = .10, p < .10, and a significant positive relationship with behavioural self-disgust, 
rs = .13, p < .05.  The non-planning subscale had a marginally significant negative 
relationship with physical self-disgust only, rs = −.10, p < .10.  Finally, self-regulation was 
significantly negatively related to both physical, rs = −.32, p < .001, and behavioural, rs = 
−.41, p < .001, self-disgust.      
 Direct Effects of Impulsivity, Emotion Regulation and Self-Regulation on Self-
 Disgust.  
 The results of the path analysis are presented in Table 2.  When conditioned on all 
other variables, the non-planning impulsivity subscale had a negative and significant direct 
effect on physical, β = −.27, p < .001, and behavioural, β = −.20, p < .01, self-disgust.  
Cognitive reappraisal significantly negatively predicted physical self-disgust, β = −.12, p < 
.05, and had a marginally significant effect on behavioural self-disgust, β = −.09, p = .093.  
Expressive suppression significantly positively predicted physical, β = .17, p < .01, and 
behavioural, β = .20, p < .001, self-disgust.  Finally, self-regulation was significantly and 
negatively associated with both physical, β = −.25, p < .001, and behavioural, β = −.42, p < 
.001, self-disgust.    
 Indirect Effects of Impulsivity on Self-Disgust. 
  The results of our hypothesised indirect path analyses are presented at the bottom of 
Table 2.  In combination, the three regulation variables (i.e., self-regulation, emotion 
regulation/cognitive reappraisal, and emotion regulation/expressive suppression) had a 
significant intervening effect between attentional impulsivity and physical, β = .12, p < .01, 
and behavioural, β = .20, p < .001, self-disgust.  This multivariate effect was driven strongly 
by the self-regulation scale, which was the only significant univariate intervening variable in 
this relationship (see Table 2).  There was also a marginally significant indirect effect of the 
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self-regulation scale and the emotion regulation subscales between non-planning impulsivity 
and physical self-disgust, β = .05, p = .050.  This effect was driven again by the self-
regulation variable (see Table 2), but also cognitive reappraisal, which was a significant 
intervening variable in  the relationship between non-planning impulsivity and physical self-
disgust, β = .02, p < .05 (see Figure 1).  
Discussion 
 Self-disgust is a self-conscious emotion schema that shares common features with 
other self-conscious emotions, such as shame and guilt, but has a unique expressive and 
phenomenological profile (Powell et al., 2015). Although research interest on the association 
between self-disgust and psychopathology has significantly increased over the last 7 years 
(e.g., Brake et al., 2017; Ille et al., 2014; Overton et al., 2008), there is a paucity of research 
on the psychological phenomena and processes that may elicit self-disgust responses (Powell 
et al., 2014; Powell et al., 2015). The present study assessed the association between self-
regulation, emotion regulation, trait impulsivity, and self-disgust, and examined different 
hypotheses with respect to these associations.  
 First, we hypothesized that, because self-disgust involves symbolic self-representation 
and cognitive complexity (Powell et al., 2014; Powell et al., 2015), people evaluate their 
behaviour against their self (or social) ideals and experience lower self-disgust when their 
ideals are met through effective self-regulation and inhibition of impulsive behaviour; 
accordingly, higher self-disgust is more likely to occur when self-regulation fails and higher 
impulsivity is exhibited. Second, based on the emotion regulation literature (d’Acremont & 
Van der Linden, 2007; Gross & John, 2003; Gross & Thompson, 2007; Haga, Kraft, & 
Corby, 2009), we anticipated that expressive suppression (positively) and cognitive 
reappraisal (negatively) would predict self-disgust. Our findings supported these hypotheses 
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and showed, for the first time, that the two facets of self-disgust that were measured in the 
present study (i.e., disgusting self/physical self-disgust and disgusting ways/behavioural self-
disgust) were differentially associated with self-regulatory variables and trait impulsivity both 
in terms of statistical significance and effect size. More specifically, the disgusting self 
subscale was negatively associated with cognitive reappraisal and self-regulation, and 
positively associated with expressive suppression and attentional impulsivity. The disgusting 
ways subscale was negatively associated with cognitive reappraisal and self-regulation, and 
positively associated with expressive suppression, attentional, and motor impulsivity. 
Although the effect sizes between self-disgust and the trait impulsivity and emotion 
regulation subscales were small according to Cohen (1992), the effect sizes between the self-
disgust subscales and self-regulation were moderate. This indicates that self-regulation is 
more strongly associated with the experience of self-disgust, as compared to emotion 
regulation strategies and impulsivity. These findings were further corroborated by path 
analysis which showed that self-regulation was more strongly and directly associated with 
both dimensions of self-disgust, as compared to the effects of emotion regulation strategies 
and impulsivity dimensions. Our final hypothesis was that self-regulation and emotion 
regulation would act as intervening variables in the effects of impulsivity on the experience 
of self-disgust. The results from the path analysis partially supported this hypothesis by 
showing significant indirect effects of attentional impulsivity on physical and behavioural 
self-disgust, and significant indirect effects of non-planning impulsivity on physical (but not 
behavioural self-disgust), via self-regulation and emotion regulation strategies.  
 Taken together, the present study has important theoretical implications. Firstly, 
although most research on self-disgust suggests that behavioural outcomes (e.g., being 
overweight) are associated with experiencing self-disgust, our findings show that self-disgust 
may be also related to the psychological characteristics (i.e., self-regulation and impulsivity) 
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that are associated with and have been found to lead to such undesirable and disgust-eliciting 
behavioural outcomes (e.g., Tangney et al., 2004). Secondly, and relatedly, impulsivity 
dimensions, and more specifically attentional and non-planning impulsivity, seem to play a 
role in the experience of self-disgust. The tendency to behave in an automatic and non-
planned manner is associated with higher self-disgust, and this association is partly explained 
by self-regulation, and to lesser extent by emotion regulation strategies. This lends support to 
our argument that people may experience self-disgust when they fail to resist impulses and 
exhibit poor regulation of their thoughts, actions, and emotions. Our cross-sectional design 
and the use of self-reports, however, do not rule out the possibility of reverse causality and 
response bias (e.g., socially desirable responding or self-deception; Paulhus, 2002). Future 
studies should examine if behavioural measures of impulsivity (e.g., disinhibition/attentional 
tasks; Moeller et al., 2001) are related to self-disgust, and whether such an association is 
explained indirectly by self-regulation. Furthermore, our study provided findings about the 
association between self-disgust and individual differences in self-regulatory capacity 
without focusing on specific behavioural outcomes. It is possible that the observed 
associations may be stronger in the context of more specific problem behaviours (e.g., 
dysfunctional drinking, sexual misconduct, problem gambling) that have been associated with 
poor self-regulation and higher impulsivity, and this is something that further research may 
look into.  
 Second, a wide range of adverse psychological, behavioural, and mental health 
outcomes have been independently associated high trait impulsivity (Grano et al., 2007; 
Moeller et al., 2001; Peluso et al., 2007), low self-regulation (e.g., Baumeister, 2003; 
Tangney et al., 2004), and higher self-disgust (Brake et al., 2017; Ille et al., 2004; Overton et 
al., 2008). Our findings suggest that impulsivity, self-regulation, and self-disgust may not 
necessarily be independent predictors of such effects. Rather, these variables seem to be 
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associated with each other in a dynamic way that may explain the bivariate associations 
described in previous research. Of course, this process needs to be more thoroughly examined 
in future studies that incorporate measures of mental health (e.g., depression) and/or adverse 
behavioural outcomes, as well as longitudinal designs that will allow for more valid 
assessments of temporally-unfolding associations.   
 Third, although the effect size of the associations between self-disgust and emotion 
regulation strategies were small they were statistically significant, even after controlling for 
the effects of self-regulation and trait impulsivity. This is the first study to demonstrate the 
differential association of emotion regulation strategies with self-disgust. In line with 
previous research on the differential effects of expressive suppression and cognitive 
reappraisal (e.g., Gross & John, 2003; Gross & Thompson, 2007), the present findings 
showed that cognitive reappraisal was negatively associated with self-disgust; thus, 
suggesting that cognitive reappraisal can act protectively against the negative effects of self-
disgust on psychological well-being. Of course this needs to be determined by future research 
that will employ specific measures of well-being and psychological functioning. On the other 
hand, expressive suppression was positively associated with self-disgust, and this is in 
accordance with previous studies which suggested that expressive suppression cannot 
sufficiently modify adverse emotional experiences (Gross & Thompson, 2007). Future 
studies may further extend our findings by assessing whether self-disgust is associated with 
other aspects of response modulation strategies, such as physiological responding, avoidance, 
and memory impairment (see Gross, 2002).  
 Our study is not free of limitations. First of all, we used a cross-sectional design and 
self-reported measures and this limits our ability to draw conclusions about causal 
associations and processes. Future studies with prospective designs can directly assess the 
temporal association between trait impulsivity, self and emotion regulation, and self-disgust, 
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and provide more robust findings concerning the ontogenesis of self-disgust experiences. 
Second, as already mentioned we did not measure psychological well-being and mental 
health outcomes. This is a major limitation for the following reasons: we cannot establish if 
the associations we found account for variations in mental health and psychological 
outcomes, and we cannot ensure that our findings were not confounded by pre-existing 
mental health conditions, such as depression. Given the strong association between self-
disgust with a range of mental health disorders (e.g., Ille et al. 2014; Overton et al., 2008), it 
is recommended that future research incorporates relevant measures. Third, self-reported 
measures of impulsivity do not always correlate with behavioural, lab-based measures 
(Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de Wit, 2006). Future research should employ a wider 
range of impulsivity measures (e.g., response inhibition tasks; ERPs; fMRI; Moeller et al., 
2001) in order to assess the association between self-disgust and state measures of 
impulsivity. Fourth, due to the number of parameters estimated in the path models, and the 
increased risk of Type I error, the present results should be considered exploratory and 
warrant replication in further confirmatory studies.    
Notwithstanding those limitations, however, our study was the first one to 
demonstrate important associations between trait impulsivity, self-regulation, emotion 
regulation strategies, and self-disgust. Furthermore, using robust statistical analyses we 
demonstrated intervening effects of self-regulation and emotion regulation on the association 
between impulsivity and self-disgust. This is an important step towards better understanding 
the psychological phenomena and processes that are related to the deleterious experience of 
self-disgust (Powell et al., 2015). 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations of study variables 
Note. N = 294. Correlations represent Spearman’s rho (rs), rank-biseral (rrb), or phi (rΦ) coefficients. ABIS = Abbreviated Impulsiveness Scale. 
SDS = Self-Disgust Scale. †p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Age - 
          
2. Gender −.15* - 
         
3. Nationality −.31*** .06 - 
        
4. Cognitive reappraisal .13* −.06 −.11† - 
       
5. Expressive suppression −.04 −.19** .05 −.09 - 
      
6. ABIS Attention −.14* .16** .08 −.13* −.08 - 
     
7. ABIS Motor −.12* .00 .15* −.05 −.07 .45*** - 
    
8. ABIS Non-planning −.00 −.08 −.10 −.20** −.02 .58*** .35*** - 
   
9. SDS Self −.05 .25*** .02 −.19** .15** .14* .10† −.10† - 
  
10. SDS Ways −.03 .03 −.08 −.19** .24*** .14* .13* .01 .64*** - 
 
11. Self-regulation .12* −.19** −.07 .24*** −.14* −.58*** −.36*** −.38*** −.32*** −.41*** - 
Range 17-51 0-1 0-1 6-42 4-28 5-18 4-16 4-16 5-35 5-34 50-145 
M 21.84 0.61 0.89 27.64 14.87 11.15 9.70 8.25 14.97 14.73 107.26 
SD 4.56 0.49 0.31 6.35 4.97 2.62 2.57 2.61 6.73 6.28 16.49 
Median 21 1 1 28 15 11 9 8 14 13.50 108 
IQR 2 1 0 8 8 3 3 4 9 9 22 
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Table 2. Direct and indirect effects in the hypothesised path model. 
Note. N = 294. SDS = Self-Disgust Scale. Estimates conditioned on age, gender, and 
nationality. Probability values determined on bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) 
bootstrapped CIs (10,000 bootstrap resamples).   
  
Model pathways β 
BCa 95% CI β 
p 
Lower Upper 
Direct path estimates     
Attention -> reappraisal −.06 −.22 .11 .466 
Attention -> suppression −.03 −.18 .13 .736 
Attention -> self-regulation −.48 −.60 −.36 .000 
Attention -> SDS self .07 −.09 .23 .418 
Attention -> SDS ways −.07 −.23 .10 .418 
Motor -> reappraisal .09 −.03 .22 .142 
Motor -> suppression −.10 −.22 .03 .145 
Motor -> self-regulation −.10 −.22 .02 .093 
Motor -> SDS self .08 −.05 .22 .222 
Motor -> SDS ways .09 −.04 .21 .193 
Non-planning -> reappraisal −.20 −.36 −.04 .018 
Non-planning  -> suppression .01 −.14 .16 .894 
Non-planning  -> self-regulation −.10 −.22 .02 .102 
Non-planning  -> SDS self −.27 −.40 −.13 .000 
Non-planning  -> SDS ways −.20 −.33 −.06 .004 
Reappraisal -> SDS self −.12 −.22 −.02 .017 
Reappraisal -> SDS ways −.09 −.18 .02 .093 
Suppression -> SDS self .17 .06 .27 .003 
Suppression -> SDS ways .20 .09 .31 .000 
Self-regulation -> SDS self −.25 −.39 −.11 .000 
Self-regulation -> SDS ways −.42 −.57 −.28 .000 
Indirect path estimates     
Attention -> reappraisal -> SDS self .01 −.01 .04 .326 
Attention -> suppression -> SDS self −.01 −.04 .02 .669 
Attention -> self-regulation -> SDS self .12 .05 .20 .000 
Attention -> ALL -> SDS self .12 .04 .21 .002 
Attention -> reappraisal -> SDS ways .01 −.01 .03 .296 
Attention -> suppression -> SDS ways −.01 −.04 .03 .690 
Attention -> self-regulation -> SDS ways .20 .13 .30 .000 
Attention -> ALL -> SDS ways .20 .12 .31 .000 
Motor -> reappraisal -> SDS self −.01 −.04 .00 .091 
Motor -> suppression -> SDS self −.02 −.05 .00 .097 
Motor -> self-regulation -> SDS self .03 −.00 .06 .055 
Motor -> ALL -> SDS self −.00 −.05 .05 .921 
Motor -> reappraisal -> SDS ways −.01 −.03 .00 .117 
Motor -> suppression -> SDS ways −.02 −.06 .00 .107 
Motor -> self-regulation -> SDS ways .04 −.01 .10 .077 
Motor -> ALL -> SDS ways .02 −.05 .08 .619 
Non-planning -> reappraisal -> SDS self .02 .00 .07 .017 
Non-planning  -> suppression -> SDS self .00 −.02 .03 .842 
Non-planning  -> self-regulation -> SDS self .03 −.00 .07 .068 
Non-planning -> ALL -> SDS self .05 .00 .11 .050 
Non-planning -> reappraisal -> SDS ways .02 −.00 .05 .056 
Non-planning  -> suppression -> SDS ways .00 −.03 .04 .862 
Non-planning  -> self-regulation -> SDS ways .04 −.01 .10 .085 
Non-planning  -> ALL -> SDS ways .06 −.01 .14 .077 
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Figure 1 caption. 
Path model explaining the effect of impulsivity in three domains (attention, motor, and non-
planning) on self-disgust via individual differences in three types of regulatory mechanisms 
(cognitive reappraisal, expressive suppression, and self-regulation).  Self-regulation 
significantly moderated the effect of attention impulsivity on physical (SDS self), β = .12, 
95% CI [.05, .20], p < .001, and behavioural (SDS ways), β = .20, 95% CI [.13, .30], p < 
.001, self-disgust.  Non-planning impulsivity had a significant indirect effect on physical self-
disgust via cognitive reappraisal, β = .02, 95% CI [.00, .07], p = .017 (see Table 2 for full 
results).  Control variables and error terms are omitted for clarity.  Estimates were 
conditioned on participants’ gender, age, and nationality.  Error terms for the three 
intervening variables were correlated, as were the error terms for the two outcome variables.  
All estimates are standardised.  Statistical significance was determined based on bias-
corrected and accelerated bootstrapped CIs (10,000 resamples). 
†
p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
***p < .001. 
 
